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Abstract
This study explores the underlying drivers of US public pension funds’ tendency to tilt their portfolios towards companies 
with stronger corporate social responsibility (CSR). Studying the equity holdings of large, internally managed US state pen-
sion funds, we find evidence that the political leaning of their beneficiaries and political pressures by state politicians affect 
funds’ investment decisions. State pension funds from states with Democratic-leaning beneficiaries tilt their portfolios more 
strongly towards companies that perform well on CSR issues, and this tendency is intensified when the state government 
is dominated by Democratic state politicians. Moreover, we find that funds which tilt their portfolios towards companies 
with superior CSR scores generate a slightly higher return compared with their counterparts. Overall, our findings indicate 
that funds align their investment choices with the financial and non-financial interests of their beneficiaries when deciding 
whether to incorporate CSR into their equity allocations.
Keywords Corporate social responsibility · CSR · Fiduciary duty · Political values · Portfolio decisions · State pension 
funds · Socially responsible investing
JEL Classification G11 · H55 · H75 · M14
Introduction
With holdings of USD 1.1 trillion in corporate stocks and 
an average ownership share of 7–8% of the total US equity 
market over the last decades,1 US state pension funds are a 
major market force in the US and global financial markets 
(Tonello and Rabimov 2010). Their market power is highly 
concentrated in the largest state pension plans, providing 
these funds with enormous influence through their holdings 
of equity positions in large publicly traded companies.2 
And these funds increasingly use their power to promote 
positive change in the corporate governance and corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) performance of their holding 
companies, including the encouragement of desirable cor-
porate behaviour such as environmental protection and better 
employment practices, as well as the avoidance of corporate 
behaviour which their beneficiaries may consider unethi-
cal.3 In particular, several studies document a positive link 
between the ownership share of US state pension funds and 
the CSR performance of their portfolio companies (John-
son and Greening 1999; Neubaum and Zahra 2006; Di Giuli 
and Kostovetsky 2014). Furthermore, by 2013 nine state  * Lisa Schopohl 
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1 Based on figures from the 2017 Annual Survey of Public Pension 
Funds, see: https ://www.censu s.gov/data/table s/2017/econ/aspp/aspp-
histo rical -table s.html.
2 According to the 2017 Public Fund Survey, assets worth of around 
USD 3.68 trillion are centred in the 180 largest funds, comprising 
95% of the entire US state and local retirement system. See http://
www.publi cfund surve y.org/.
3 We follow Barnea & Rubin (2010) and McWilliams & Siegel 
(2001) and define CSR as firms’ policies and actions with respect 
to employees, communities and the environment which exceed legal 
requirements.
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and local government pension plans had signed the United 
Nations-supported Principles for Responsible Investment 
(PRI) and thereby committed to incorporate aspects of CSR 
into investment practices, while since 2014 six additional 
state and local plans joined the PRI.4
Relatively little is known about the determinants of state 
pension funds’ preferences for companies with stronger CSR 
performance, and the research that exists mainly regards 
public pension funds as one homogeneous investor class 
with respect to their motivation and propensity for incorpo-
rating CSR factors into their investment decisions.5 How-
ever, only few public pension funds have developed an inter-
est in CSR and have taken up leadership roles in promoting 
responsible investment practices. Hence, the question arises 
what motivates some US public pension funds to consider 
their investment targets’ CSR when making investment 
decisions. Following Aguilera et al.’s (2007) conceptual 
framework, institutional investors may consider CSR due to 
instrumental reasons, such as improving the financial per-
formance of their portfolios, due to relational reasons based 
on claims by their stakeholders to account for CSR factors, 
or due to moral motives as they are guided by their own—
or their beneficiaries’—norms and values. While much of 
the existing CSR literature is concerned with analysing the 
financial impact of CSR, both on the corporate level as well 
as for responsible investment strategies,6 and hence focuses 
on instrumental motives, surprisingly little is known about 
the relational and moral drivers of institutional investors’ 
CSR preferences and the question whose morals should be 
guiding institutional investors’ investment processes. Our 
study aims to fill this gap by analysing whether US public 
pension funds’ propensity for incorporating CSR into their 
investment decisions is driven by instrumental, relational or 
moral motives. To do so, we focus on a sub-group of these 
funds that due to their strong beneficiary focus and relative 
independence in decision-making should be most prone and 
able to incorporate ethics in general and CSR in particular 
into investment processes (Ryan and Schneider 2002; Cox 
and Wicks 2011): large, internally managed public pension 
funds.7
From the perspective of business ethics, these so far 
unexplored relational and moral drivers of public pension 
funds’ investment decisions are particularly relevant when 
analysing the role of morals in financial markets and the 
extent to which the incorporation of CSR into investment 
practices can foster the ethicalisation of investment pro-
cesses, as argued in Cox and Wicks (2011), and may help 
to align funds’ investment practices with the interests and 
norms of their beneficiaries. In other words, if not even US 
public pension funds had a propensity to incorporate ethical 
considerations into their investment decision-making, then 
shareholder ethics, at least with regard to large institutional 
investors, may be considered a contradiction. If US public 
pension funds, however, are considering ethical aspects in 
their investment decision-making, then they may be a part 
or even an engine of the conceptual business revolution “to 
a more responsible capitalism” observed by Freeman (2017, 
p. 462) since the 2008 global financial crisis.
Based on Aguilera et al.’s (2007) conceptual framework 
and a review of the existing literature, we develop three 
channels that could explain the differences in public pension 
funds’ investment choices. First, drawing on the literature on 
the impact of political values (Hong and Kostovetsky 2012; 
Di Giuli and Kostovetsky 2014) and social norms (Cahan 
et al. 2017) on investment decision-making, public pension 
funds may be guided by their beneficiaries’ attitudes towards 
CSR, in line with Aguilera et al.’s relational and moral 
motives for CSR preferences. Hence, they may incorporate 
CSR criteria into their investment decisions if these are 
aligned with their beneficiaries’ attitudes towards CSR, as 
measured by beneficiaries’ political leaning. We call this the 
“beneficiaries’ interests” channel. Alternatively, state politi-
cians may use the funds’ investments as an extended politi-
cal campaigning tool or policy apparatus to extract personal 
benefits, as suggested by the literature on political connec-
tions and pressures in public pension funds (Romano 1993, 
1995; Wang and Mao 2015; Bradley et al. 2016; Andonov 
5 A notable exception is the study by Wang and Mao (2015) but their 
findings on public pension funds’ environmental and social share-
holder activism suggests very different drivers compared to our find-
ings.
6 For instance, Friede et  al. (2015) in their meta-analysis document 
more than 2000 empirical studies on the financial performance of 
CSR and responsible investment. See also the critique of Capelle-
Blancard, & Monjon (2012) on the current state of the responsible 
investment literature.
7 We expand on this point in Section  "Investment Processes in US 
Public Pension Funds" and "Public Pension Funds’ Equity Invest-
ments and their Preferences for CSR".
4 The pension funds that signed the PRI prior to 2013 comprise 
CalPERS, CalSTRS, Connecticut Retirement Plans and Trust Funds, 
Illinois State Board of Investments, Los Angeles County Employ-
ees Retirement Association, Maryland State Retirement and Pension 
System, New York City Employees’ Retirement System, New York 
State Common Retirement System, State Universities’ Retirement 
System of Illinois. Several of these funds are also founding and draft-
ing members of the PRI and thus are at the forefront of the respon-
sible investment movement. All of these pension funds are located 
in states that are predominantly Democratic leaning, as classified 
by their overall votes in the presidential election from 1996 to 2012 
which covers the relevant period of our sample. In addition, since 
2014 the Teachers’ Retirement System of the City of New York, San 
Francisco Employees Retirement System, Seattle City Employees’ 
Retirement System, the Employees’ Retirement System of the State 
of Hawaii, the Office of the Illinois State Treasurer, and the City of 
Chicago (City Treasurer’s Office) have become signatories to the PRI. 
See: https ://www.unpri .org/signa torie s.
State Pension Funds and Corporate Social Responsibility: Do Beneficiaries’ Political Values…
1 3
et al. 2018). In this regard, public pension funds may be 
pressured by state politicians to promote CSR, irrespective 
of whether its social and environmental objectives align with 
their beneficiaries’ interests. In this case, public pension 
funds are driven by relational motives, but instead of prior-
itising beneficiaries’ interests, they cater to another of their 
stakeholders, state politicians. We term this the “political 
pressures” channel. Finally, public pension funds’ propen-
sity to tilt their portfolios towards CSR might be unrelated 
to any relational or moral factors. Instead, the funds might 
consider the incorporation of CSR factors as a pure invest-
ment strategy to improve funds’ portfolio performance in 
line with findings in the literature that institutional inves-
tors and pension funds in particular predominantly focus on 
the financial impact and the ‘business case’ of responsible 
investment (e.g., Petersen and Vredenburg 2009; Himick and 
Audousset-Coulier 2016). This channel is based on instru-
mental motives and is termed the “pure financial motives” 
channel. In other words, we ask: Are state pension funds 
reflecting social movements in terms of shifting norms and 
values among their beneficiaries (Arjaliès 2010; Peattie and 
Samuels 2018)? Or are they merely playing politics (Wang 
and Mao 2015; Bradley et al. 2016; Andonov et al. 2018) or 
optimising financial returns without much ethical reflection?
These three channels have different implications for the 
drivers of the relation between funds’ portfolio allocation 
decisions and firms’ CSR scores, and for the link between 
funds’ portfolio performance and the aggregate CSR score 
of their portfolio. These different implications allow us to 
empirically test which of these channels drives funds’ incor-
poration of CSR into investment decisions. Looking at the 
public equity holdings of 31 large, internally managed US 
state pension funds, we find that funds with Democratic-
leaning beneficiaries tilt their portfolios more strongly 
towards companies with high CSR scores than their counter-
parts with predominantly Republican-leaning beneficiaries. 
Additionally, we show that funds with a Democratic-leaning 
beneficiary base show a stronger CSR preference if the state 
government is predominantly affiliated with the Democratic 
Party. Finally, we document a weakly positive association 
between the funds’ portfolio performance and the portfolio’s 
CSR score. This finding suggests that public pension funds’ 
CSR preferences do not harm fund performance and thus 
are not detrimental to beneficiaries’ financial interests. We 
interpret these results as indicative that state pension funds 
incorporate their beneficiaries’ political values and attitudes 
towards CSR into investment choices, consistent with the 
“beneficiaries’ interests” channel.
Our study makes three distinct contributions to the CSR 
and responsible investment literature. First, while several 
previous studies have shown a positive link between public 
pension funds’ ownership share and the CSR performance 
of their investment targets (e.g., Johnson and Greening 1999; 
Neubaum and Zahra 2006; Di Giuli and Kostovetsky 2014) 
and attributed this link to social norms and values that these 
funds are subjected to (Cox and Wicks 2011; Cahan et al. 
2017), these studies do not further investigate how such 
norms and values might govern pension funds’ investment 
decisions and whose norms and values are considered. We 
extend this literature by showing that it is funds’ beneficiar-
ies’ values which determine their responsible investment 
practices and we provide a channel through which benefi-
ciaries’ values and norms can transfer from individuals to 
the governing body and portfolio management of pension 
funds, namely via funds’ positive screening towards CSR. 
While the importance of political values in investment 
decisions has previously been documented for individual 
mutual fund and hedge fund managers (Hong and Kostovet-
sky 2012) and in corporate finance for CEOs, and founders 
and directors (Di Giuli and Kostovetsky 2014), we are the 
first to analyse how political values and norms play a role 
in US public pension funds whose institutional character-
istics differ considerably from the previously investigated 
actors. As such our study contributes to a growing body of 
research in business ethics on the role of morals in markets 
and the foundations of the ethicalisation of investment prac-
tices through responsible investment strategies (see Cox and 
Wicks 2011; Hoepner and Schopohl 2018) by analysing one 
channel through which beneficiaries’ moral values can affect 
public pension funds’ investment decisions.
Second, we extend the literature on the drivers of state 
pension funds’ investment preferences towards CSR. To 
the best of our knowledge, only one other study by Wang 
and Mao (2015) tries to explain the dynamic changes of US 
public pension funds’ investment behaviour in relation to 
CSR. The authors link public pension funds’ probability to 
submit CSR-related shareholder proposals to the degree of 
political self-dealing by state politicians on funds’ board of 
trustees, and find that funds act against their beneficiaries’ 
interests. Our study provides a counter point to Wang and 
Mao (2015). We show that public pension funds’ tendency 
to positively screen for investment targets with stronger CSR 
is based on moral considerations, reflects their beneficiar-
ies’ values and norms, and therefore is aligned with their 
beneficiaries’ interests.
Finally, our study contributes to the debate on the align-
ment of responsible investment with the fiduciary duties 
of institutional investors (e.g., Rounds 2005; Freshfields 
Bruckhaus Deringer 2005; Sethi 2005; Richardson 2007, 
2011; Sandberg 2011; Hawley et al. 2014), by providing 
empirical evidence that US public pension funds can incor-
porate their beneficiaries’ moral and political values into 
their responsible investment practice without jeopardising 
beneficiaries’ financial interests. Hence, our findings sup-
port arguments by Sethi (2005) that public pension funds’ 
responsible investment practices are aligned with their 
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fiduciary duty, while they do not back concerns expressed 
by opponents of responsible investment that “social invest-
ing subverts a fiduciary’s common-law duty of undivided 
loyalty” and serves as a “vehicle for political mischief at the 
expense of the interests of taxpayers” (Rounds 2005, p. 76). 
As such, we contribute to a discussion in the business ethics 
literature that argues for a broadening of the interpretation 
of fiduciary duties and an expansion of the understanding of 
beneficiaries’ interests beyond purely financial ones to entail 
beneficiaries’ values and norms (see Richardson 2007, 2009, 
2011; Jansson et al. 2014; Hoepner and Schopohl 2018).
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 
"Literature Review and Hypotheses Development" provides 
an overview of the existing literature and derives testable 
hypotheses. Section "Methods" describes the methodologi-
cal design of our study and the data. In Section "Findings 
and Discussion of Results", we present the results of our 
empirical analyses. We test the robustness of our findings 
in Section Robustness Tests. In Section "Conclusions", we 
draw conclusions and discuss the implications of our find-
ings for fiduciary asset management.
Literature Review and Hypotheses 
Development
To motivate our empirical analyses, we first review the 
investment processes in US public pension funds and argue 
that several institutional features of these funds make them 
particularly prone to consider CSR in their portfolio alloca-
tion, before we discuss the existing empirical evidence on 
the link between public pension fund equity ownership and 
firms’ CSR performance. We then derive testable hypotheses 
regarding the drivers of public pension funds’ preferences 
for firms with stronger CSR performance, inspired by the 
conceptual framework of the drivers of CSR preferences 
developed in Aguilera et al. (2007).
Investment Processes in US Public Pension Funds
Public pension funds differ significantly from other insti-
tutional investors regarding their investment processes and 
objectives. First, public pension funds are particularly well 
placed to consider the CSR performance of their portfolio 
companies due to their long-term investment horizon and 
their holdings of a significant share in the entire equity mar-
ket (Ryan and Schneider 2002; Cox and Wicks 2011). The 
interplay of these two factors makes them especially suscep-
tible to risks that materialise in the long term and that are 
the result of externalities affecting the whole market. Since 
CSR factors represent good indicators of such long-term 
externalities, public pension funds may consider the CSR 
performance of their portfolio companies as a way to man-
age their exposure to these long-term externalities.8
Second, public pension funds are governed by a board of 
trustees which sets funds’ investment policies and is respon-
sible for the appointment of investment managers (Andonov 
et al. 2018). Through these channels, the board can directly 
influence the degree to which the fund incorporates respon-
sible investment practices into its investment process (Wang 
and Mao 2015). Due to the representation of state officials 
and politicians on public pension funds’ boards, funds’ 
investment policies may be subject to political influences, 
more so than corporate pension funds’ policies (Romano 
1993; Andonov et al. 2018).
Third, while several of the smaller public pension funds 
appoint external investment managers for the day-to-day 
management of their funds, the largest US public pension 
funds tend to conduct a considerable share of their invest-
ment management internally via their own in-house asset 
managers (Ryan and Schneider 2002; Cox and Wicks 
2011). In-house management fundamentally differs from 
contracted-out, external management. In-house fund man-
agers are salaried employees, their remuneration is usually 
not closely tied to short-term performance targets, and their 
sole responsibility and duties lie with their employer. These 
factors make in-house managers more likely to adopt longer-
term and more stable investment approaches such as those 
associated with CSR (Neubaum and Zahra 2006; Cox et al. 
2008) and can ensure that their investment philosophy is 
aligned with the long-term culture and values of the pension 
plan and its members (Cox and Wicks 2011).
Finally, US public pension funds are not subject to the 
same strict fiduciary standards of ERISA as private US pen-
sion funds, which—according to the traditional interpreta-
tion of ERISA—require funds to purely focus on financial 
factors and disregard social and environmental concerns 
from their investment choices (Lydenberg 2007). In com-
parison, fiduciary standards for US public pension funds 
are typically based on state regulation and less strictly inter-
preted (Wang and Mao 2015), potentially offering them 
greater discretion towards responsible investment.
While these factors suggest that US public pension funds 
should have greater leeway and be more prone to consider 
the CSR performance of firms in their investment decisions, 
the issue whether they indeed tilt their portfolios towards 
companies with stronger CSR performance remains an 
empirical question.
8 Pension funds are considered ‘universal owners’ due to their large 
size and considerable investment exposure to essentially the entire 
investment market (Hawley and Williams 2000; Jensen 2002). For 
universal owners, externalities of some of their portfolio companies 
are not ‘true’ externalities due to the negative effects on other holding 
companies.
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Public Pension Funds’ Equity Investments and Their 
Preferences for CSR
The first study documenting differences among institutional 
investor classes in their preferences for firms’ CSR perfor-
mance is by Johnson and Greening (1999). Analysing the 
link between the equity ownership of different investors and 
the investment target’s CSR performance as measured by 
KLD (now MSCI ESG) ratings, the authors find a positive 
relation between the percentage of a firm’s equity owned by 
US public pension funds and the firm’s CSR performance, 
while the ownership share by mutual funds and investment 
banks shows no significant link to firms’ CSR factors. Since 
then, findings presented in Neubaum and Zahra (2006) and 
Di Giuli and Kostovetsky (2014) have confirmed the positive 
link suggesting that firms that do well on CSR dimensions 
are significantly more likely to be owned by public pension 
funds.
However, several studies cast doubt on the unequivo-
cal preference of US public pension funds for firms with 
good CSR performance. For instance, Barnea and Rubin 
(2010), using the same data sources as Johnson and Green-
ing (1999), document a negative relation between public 
pension fund ownership and a firm’s CSR performance as 
measured by a firm’s net CSR score, i.e., its CSR strengths 
over its CSR weaknesses. In addition, Cox and Schneider 
(2010) analyse the equity holdings of US state pension funds 
in UK public companies and find no significant relation-
ship between the ownership by US state pension funds and 
a firm’s CSR performance. The authors, therefore, conclude 
that the overseas investments of US state pension funds are 
predominantly driven by financial considerations and less 
by firms’ CSR credentials. Finally, results presented in Cox 
and Wicks (2011) point towards the importance of internal 
versus external investment management in affecting funds’ 
propensity towards CSR factors. The authors find that CSR 
plays a primary role in the share selection decisions for 
internally managed public pension funds, while for exter-
nally managed funds CSR considerations carry less weight.
Overall, the review of the literature provides mixed 
results regarding the link between public pension funds’ 
equity holdings and firms’ CSR performance and raises the 
question whether US public pension funds might differ in the 
extent to which they incorporate CSR factors into investment 
decisions. In the next section, we suggest three alternative 
explanations why some pension funds might show a propen-
sity for CSR factors, and we derive hypotheses to empiri-
cally test which of these channels may explain CSR-related 
equity allocations of a sample of large, internally managed 
US state pension funds.
Hypotheses Development
Beneficiaries’ Interests Channel
Aguilera et al. (2007) suggest that CSR interests at the insti-
tutional level can be driven by relational and moral motives 
as institutional actors aim to act according to their steward-
ship duties and aim to reflect the higher-order values and 
norms of their stakeholders and society. In terms of institu-
tional investors, Cahan et al. (2017) argue that such moral 
drivers are behind the positive CSR screening practices of 
certain norm-constrained investors, such as public pension 
funds. However, the authors do not empirically analyse how 
such norms affect investors’ portfolio allocations and whose 
norms are considered by these institutions.
For the case of public pension funds, their fiduciary duty 
defines whose interests should be given priority to as it 
obliges these funds to make investment decisions in the best 
interests of their beneficiaries. Hence, Barber (2007) argues 
that if public pension funds are to incorporate companies’ 
CSR performance into their investment choices, they should 
align their investment allocations with the moral norms and 
political values of their beneficiaries, but should not forgo 
beneficiaries’ financial objectives.9 In other words, if public 
pension funds were to oblige by their beneficiaries’ interests 
and values, they should only incorporate CSR considerations 
into their portfolio allocations if they are in the interests of 
their beneficiaries, i.e., in line with beneficiaries’ norms and 
values and not detrimental to funds’ portfolio performance. 
We call this the “beneficiaries’ interests” channel.
Attempting to measure attitudes towards CSR, several 
studies have shown that the political leaning of individuals 
is significantly linked to their propensity for incorporating 
environmental and social factors into investment decisions. 
For instance, Di Giuli and Kostovetsky (2014) show that 
firms with Democratic-leaning CEOs, founders and direc-
tors spend more on CSR activities and have a higher CSR 
rating than companies with no affiliations to the Democratic 
Party. In addition, Hong and Kostovetsky (2012) analyse 
the portfolio holdings of Democratic-leaning mutual fund 
and hedge fund managers and show that Democratic-lean-
ing fund managers invest less in industries that are not in 
line with the Democratic political agenda such as tobacco, 
natural resources, and guns and defence, whereas they tilt 
9 For instance, Thomas DiNapoli, trustee of the New York State 
Common Retirement Fund, stated that “it has been our experience 
that integrating relevant environmental, social and governance con-
siderations into the investment decision-making process enhances 
our ability to achieve our objectives [to meet the obligations of our 
pension fund for current and future members, retirees and beneficiar-
ies]”. See https ://www.ceres .org/resou rces/repor ts/21st-centu ry-inves 
tor-ceres -bluep rint-susta inabl e-inves ting#.
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towards environmentally friendly firms and firms that score 
well on matters of diversity, community and employee rela-
tions.10 Taken together, the results of these two studies sug-
gest that people’s political leaning is closely linked to their 
attitudes towards CSR. Applying these insights to the case of 
public pension funds, we argue that beneficiaries’ norms and 
values towards CSR can be approximated by their political 
leaning, which results in the following two hypotheses for 
funds’ portfolio allocation and portfolio performance for the 
“beneficiaries’ interests” channel:
H1a A pension fund holds a larger share of its portfolio in 
companies with strong CSR performance if its beneficiar-
ies have a preference for CSR as captured by their political 
leaning.
H1b A pension fund’s portfolio-weighted CSR score is not 
negatively related to the fund’s portfolio performance.
Political Pressures Channel
An alternative mechanism that may explain the propensity 
of some public pension funds to incorporate CSR consid-
erations into investment decisions is through political pres-
sures exerted on the funds by state politicians. This argument 
is based on the existing literature on political self-dealing 
in public pension funds (Romano 1993, 1995; Wang and 
Mao 2015; Bradley et al. 2016; Andonov et al. 2018). This 
body of work suggests that state politicians may influence 
funds’ investment decisions either directly through their rep-
resentation on the board of trustees, or indirectly through 
their representative power in the state government and by 
occupying political offices with considerable influence over 
state pension funds. For instance, Wang and Mao (2015), 
studying the shareholder proposals submitted by US public 
pension funds, show that the number of proposals on envi-
ronmental and social issues increases significantly as more 
politically affiliated trustees run for office and conclude that 
“public pension fund board members employ shareholder 
proposals to enhance their political capital”.11 In addition, 
they find that the market reacts more negatively to propos-
als submitted while trustees run for office which suggests 
that these proposals do not serve beneficiaries’ financial 
interests. These findings are in line with the wider literature 
which documents a negative link between the strength of 
the political influence over public pension funds and funds’ 
financial performance (e.g., Romano 1993, 1995; Bradley 
et al. 2016; Andonov et al. 2018).
Hence, a second channel to explain why some funds tilt 
their portfolios towards firms with superior CSR is through 
their relational ties to another of their main stakeholders—
state politicians—who exert pressures on public pension 
funds to adopt responsible investment policies. In particular, 
state politicians affiliated with the Democratic party may 
pressure funds to implement a CSR-focused investment 
policy aligned with the Democratic agenda to use the invest-
ments of public pension funds as an extended campaign-
ing tool at the potential detriment of beneficiaries’ interests 
(Wang and Mao 2015). We call this the “political pressures” 
channel and based on Aguilera et al.’s (2007) framework, 
it reflects relational motives for CSR through public pen-
sion funds’ link to state politicians. The “political pressures” 
channel comprises the following two predictions:
H2a A pension fund holds a larger share of its portfolio in 
companies with strong CSR performance if it is subject to 
stronger political pressures by Democratic state politicians.
H2b A pension fund’s portfolio-weighted CSR score is 
negatively related to the fund’s portfolio performance.
Pure Financial Motives Channel
Finally, the link between funds’ propensity to invest in com-
panies with stronger CSR performance could be unrelated 
to any political pressures or moral considerations. Instead, 
pension funds might take CSR factors into account as they 
believe that incorporating a firm’s environmental and social 
performance into investment decisions can improve their 
funds’ portfolio performance.12 As such, public pension 
funds’ responsible investment practices would be purely 
instrumentally driven as funds considered positive CSR 
screens as a means to realise superior investment outcomes 
(Aguilera et al. 2007). For instance, Himick and Audousset-
Coulier (2016) analysed the statements of investment poli-
cies of 60 Canadian public pension funds and show that the 
financial frame of responsible investment dominates the 
social frame in funds’ investment policies as funds’ primary 
12 Survey evidence suggests that the two top motivations of institu-
tional investors for considering CSR factors are improving returns 
and managing risk. Furthermore, Anne Simpson, Senior Portfolio 
Manager and Director of Global Governance of CalPERS justifies 
CalPERS’s responsible investment strategies by citing the fund’s 
investment belief that “environmental, social and governance factors 
can affect the risk and return performance of investment portfolios to 
varying degrees across companies, sectors, regions and asset classes”. 
See https ://www.ceres .org/resou rces/repor ts/21st-centu ry-inves tor-
ceres -bluep rint-susta inabl e-inves ting#.
10 In both studies, the political leaning of the individuals is approxi-
mated by contributions to presidential candidate election campaigns.
11 Wang and Mao (2015) do not differentiate by party affiliation of 
the state politicians but we argue in our study that only the Demo-
cratic political agenda aligns with promoting CSR core issues and 
hence only Democrats benefit from being associated to state pension 
funds incorporating CSR factors into their investment decisions.
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motive for engaging in responsible investment seems to 
relate to financial considerations, such as improving returns 
or managing risks. Petersen and Vredenburg (2009) obtain 
similar results based on a survey of Canadian institutional 
investors in oil and gas companies which state financial 
objectives and their belief in a positive link between CSR 
and corporate financial performance as a motivating force 
to invest in companies with higher environmental and social 
performance.
A vast body of research has attempted to empirically test 
the link between CSR performance and financial perfor-
mance, both by evaluating the performance of responsible 
investment portfolios, including SRI mutual funds, and by 
assessing the link between measures of firms’ CSR per-
formance and corporate financial performance. However, 
the findings in the literature remain ambiguous, with some 
studies suggesting a positive link (e.g., Derwall et al. 2005; 
Kempf and Osthoff 2007; Statman and Glushkov 2009; 
Edmans 2011),13 some documenting a negative link (e.g., 
Geczy et al. 2005; Adler and Kritzman 2008; De Haan et al. 
2012),14 and others finding no (consistent) significant rela-
tion between CSR and financial performance (e.g., Bauer 
et al. 2005; Bello 2005; Galema et al. 2008; Renneboog et al. 
2008, 2011; Gil-Bazo et al. 2010)15. Due to the size of this 
literature which covers more than 2200 individual studies 
(Friede et al. 2015), a comprehensive review goes beyond 
the scope of our study. However, we can turn to the findings 
of several meta-analyses which aim to determine the domi-
nant relation between CSR and financial performance across 
this vast body of literature, (e.g., Orlitzky et al. 2003; Mar-
golis et al. 2009; Rathner 2013; Friede et al. 2015). Covering 
around 2200 individual studies, Friede et al. (2015) conclude 
that around 90% of studies provide empirical evidence for a 
non-negative link between CSR and financial performance, 
while the majority of studies suggest a positive relation 
between both constructs. For studies on the investment per-
formance of responsible portfolios, including mutual funds, 
the majority of evidence hints at a neutral, non-negative rela-
tion between CSR and investment performance, implying 
that responsible investors are at least not financially hurt by 
adopting a responsible investment approach. Similar results 
are obtained by Margolis et al. (2009) and Orlitzky et al. 
(2003) who find, on balance, only a small but positive link 
between CSR and financial performance and stress that this 
finding depends on several moderating factors including 
studies’ methodological approach, the sample choice and the 
choice of the measures for CSR and financial performance 
(see also Rathner 2013, for a more formal analysis of the 
impact of primary study characteristics on the likelihood 
of finding a performance differential between responsible 
investment portfolios and conventional portfolios).
Hence, the existing literature provides some support that 
public pension funds may turn to environmental and social 
factors purely as a way of generating improved portfolio 
returns, irrespective of any wider ethical considerations and 
political pressures. We call this the “pure financial motives” 
channel and it comprises the following two predictions.
H3a A pension fund’s propensity for incorporating CSR fac-
tors into their share selection is not related to any political 
or social factors of the fund or the state.
H3b A pension fund’s portfolio-weighted CSR score is posi-
tively related to the fund’s portfolio performance.
Methods
Next, we outline the methodological design of our analyses 
to test these sets of hypotheses.
Sample
Based on the above discussion of the literature, our sample 
of public pension funds comprises large, internally managed 
US state pension plans as this sub-group is well suited to 
incorporate CSR considerations into their investment deci-
sions. Focusing our analysis on internally managed holdings 
also enables us to rule out that our results are affected by 
investment processes and incentive effects of the external 
management company that are unrelated to state plan-spe-
cific investment incentives.
We obtain data on the public equity holdings of these 
large internally managed US state pension funds from 
the Thomson Ownership Holdings Database. This data-
base mainly relies on the holdings reported to the Security 
Exchange Commission (SEC) but further supplements this 
information with holdings data gathered from international 
13 For instance, Edmans (2011) shows that portfolios comprising 
firms with high employee satisfaction outperform those with a lower 
level of employee satisfaction on a risk-adjusted basis. Derwall et al. 
(2005) document that portfolios of companies with strong environ-
mental credentials generate significant risk-adjusted excess returns. 
Statman & Glushkov (2009) and Kempf & Osthoff (2007) provide 
evidence that portfolios comprising firms with strong CSR policies 
outperform portfolios consisting of weak CSR companies.
14 For instance, De Haan et  al (2012) find a negative link between 
corporate environmental performance and corporate stock returns. In 
addition, several studies argue that there are significant costs involved 
with imposing responsible investment screens on portfolios (e.g. 
Geczy et al. 2005; Adler and Kritzman 2008).
15 For instance, Bauer et  al. (2005), Bello (2005), Galema et  al. 
(2008), Gil-Bazo et  al. (2010) and Renneboog et  al. (2008, 2011) 
analyse the investment performance of mutual funds which integrate 
CSR factors into their portfolio allocation decisions relative to their 
conventional peers and predominantly find a non-significant perfor-
mance differential between these two groups.
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filings and shareholder reports. The externally managed 
holdings of public pension funds are filed under the name 
of the external management company, so they are automati-
cally screened out from the stated holdings in the Thomson 
Ownership database.
We manually searched the database and identified 31 state 
pension funds located in 23 different states. Compared to 
previous studies that rely on US state pension funds’ equity 
holdings, our sample is comparable in size and even larger 
than the sample usually employed in the literature (e.g., 
Woidtke 2002; Cremers and Nair 2005; Dittmar and Mahrt-
Smith 2007; Barnea and Rubin 2010; Brown et al. 2015; 
Bradley et al. 2016).16 Table 1 lists the 31 pension funds and 
their state, together with additional summary statistics at the 
pension-fund level. Our sample period runs from 1997Q1 
to 2013Q4. In the majority of our analyses, we restrict our 
sample to funds’ holdings in S&P500 companies as our CSR 
measure is only available for S&P500 companies during our 
entire sample period and we want to avoid any time bias in 
our results (see Hong and Kostovetsky 2012). However, in 
Section "Robustness Tests", we test the robustness of our 
results to including companies for which CSR scores are not 
consistently available over the entire sample period. We do 
not have holdings data for all 31 funds over the entire sample 
period as some funds only report their holdings for sub-peri-
ods of the sample. The average (median) number of quarters 
per fund is 43 (55). For 14 of the 31 funds, we are able to 
obtain holdings data over the entire sample period.17 The 
average number of funds per quarter is 19, with a minimum 
of 15 pension funds per quarter for 1997Q1 and a maximum 
of 26 pension funds per quarter for 2013Q4. Finally, most 
funds are invested in the vast majority of companies that 
are part of the S&P500 index, with the average sample fund 
holding 392 out of 500 companies in every quarter of the 
sample. However, several funds do only invest in a small 
sub-set of the S&P500 with one fund only holding eleven 
S&P500 companies.18
Dependent Variables
To test our first set of predictions regarding the determinants 
of funds’ portfolio allocations, our main dependent variable 
is a company’s weight in the fund’s portfolio. We call this 
variable portfolio weight ( wijt ). While some earlier stud-
ies have documented a link between the CSR performance 
of firms and their ownership share by state pension funds 
(e.g., Johnson and Greening 1999; Di Giuli and Kostovet-
sky 2014), we focus on the fund portfolio level by directly 
employing funds’ portfolio weights as our dependent vari-
able. The reason for our choice of dependent variable is that 
holdings, and hence portfolio weights, are more indicative 
of funds’ investment preferences (Fich et al. 2015), because 
they directly reflect funds’ portfolio allocation decisions. In 
contrast, the percentage of shares held by a fund compared 
to the firm’s total number of shares outstanding is not nec-
essarily reflective of the relative importance of a particular 
firm in the fund’s portfolio as it is highly dependent on the 
fund’s total assets under management.
Following Grinblatt et al. (1995), we calculate portfolio 
weights ( wijt ) in the following way:
 where valijt is the value of the holding in company i held 
by pension fund j at the end of quarter t and ∑N
i
valijt Sis 
the total portfolio value held by pension fund j at the end of 
quarter t in all S&P500 companies.
To test our second set of predictions, we calculate the 
quarterly portfolio returns on a fund’s S&P500 holdings 
( 
(
rjt
)
 ) by weighting the return of each holding i 
(
rit
)
 by its 
weight in fund j’s portfolio at the end of the previous quarter (
wijt−1
)
 where 
(
rjt
)
 is the quarterly portfolio-weighted return of fund 
j over quarter t.
We re-balance the portfolio every quarter based on the 
new portfolio weights.
Main Independent Variables
CSR Scores
The company-specific CSR scores are obtained from Kinder, 
Lydenberg, Domini and Co. which has been acquired by 
Riskmetrics and is now owned by MSCI (MSCI ESG). 
MSCI ESG ratings are a commonly used measure of a com-
pany’s CSR performance in the literature and have been 
employed in prior studies of the link between public pension 
(1)wijt =
valijt
∑N
i
valijt
(2)rjt =
∑N
i
rit ∗ wijt−1
16 There are two reasons why only few plans are featured in the data-
base relative to the total number of state pension plans. First, some 
public plans are exempt from disclosing their holdings, e.g. because 
their assets under investment discretion are less than USD 100 mil-
lion, their holdings are below 10,000 stocks and less than USD 
200,000; or the SEC grants a confidentiality waiver. Second, several 
funds outsource their portfolio management to external managers 
(Del Guercio and Tkac 2002; Lakonishok et al. 1992).
17 In unreported results, we perform a sub-sample analysis using 
only these 14 funds to ensure that our results are not affected by the 
increase in the number of funds over time. The results are qualita-
tively unchanged.
18 In unreported results, we perform a sub-sample analysis using 
only funds that hold less than 90% of the companies in the S&P500 
restricting our sample to 12 funds. The results are qualitatively 
unchanged.
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funds’ equity ownership and firms’ CSR performance in 
the US market (Johnson and Greening 1999; Neubaum 
and Zahra 2006; Barnea and Rubin 2010; see also Hong 
and Kostovetksy 2012; Di Giuli and Kostovetsky 2014, for 
examples from the political values literature). Despite being 
widely used, MSCI ESG ratings are not without critics.19 
As an alternative, recent studies such as Ferrell et al. (2016) 
use MSCI’s latest CSR measure, Intangible Value Assess-
ment (IVA). The reason why we rely on the standard MSCI 
ESG scores in our main analysis is because of its longer 
history of available ratings for a considerable share of the 
US equity market which ensures maximum coverage of our 
sample period. Alternative CSR measures tend to have a 
significantly more limited data availability. However, in 
Section “Alternative CSR Measure”, we replace the MSCI 
ESG scores with the more recent IVA/EcoValue21 rating 
Table 1  Overview sample funds
This table reports the names of the 31 US state pension plans in our sample, together with summary statis-
tics at the pension-fund level
Abbreviation represents the abbreviated name of the pension plan used in this study
State is the US state that the pension plan is located in
Q is the number of quarters for which we have available holdings data
Shares represents the time-series average of the number of S&P500 companies held by the pension plan.
Name of the pension fund Abbreviation State Q Shares
1 Alaska Retirement Management Board AlaskaRMB AK 31 25
2 Arizona Safety Personnel Retirement System ArizonaSafePERS AZ 24 75
3 Arizona State Retirement System ArizonaStateRS AZ 11 499
4 California Public Employees’ Retirement System CalPERS CA 68 492
5 California State Teachers’ Retirement System CalSTRS CA 68 486
6 Colorado Public Employees’ Retirement Association ColoradoPERA CO 68 493
7 Florida State Board of Administration FloridaSBA FL 68 489
8 Illinois Municipal Retirement System IllinoisMunRS IL 8 488
9 Kentucky Retirement Systems KentuckyRetS KY 38 428
10 Kentucky Teachers’ Retirement System KentuckyTRS KY 68 495
11 Louisiana State Employees’ Retirement System LouisianaSERS LA 1 498
12 Michigan Municipal Employees’ Retirement System MichiganMunERS MI 2 498
13 Michigan Treasury MichiganTreas MI 68 496
14 Montana Board of Investments MontanaInvB MT 24 73
15 New York City Employee Retirement System NYCityERS NY 8 36
16 New Jersey Board of Investments NJInvB NJ 68 377
17 New York State Common Retirement System NYStateComRS NY 68 498
18 New York State Teachers’ Retirement System NYStateTRS NY 68 490
19 New Mexico Educational Retirement Board NewMexicoERB NM 68 446
20 Ohio Public Employees Retirement System OhioPERS OH 68 494
21 Ohio State Teachers’ Retirement System OhioTRS OH 68 461
22 Oregon Public Employees’ Retirement System OregonPERS OR 17 499
23 Pennsylvania Public School Employees’ Retirement 
System
PennsylvaniaPSERS PA 55 498
24 South Dakota Board of Investments SouthDakotaInvB SD 24 253
25 Tennessee Consolidated Retirement System TennesseeConsRS TN 24 376
26 Texas Employees’ Retirement System TexasERS TX 62 487
27 Texas Teachers’ Retirement System TexasTRS TX 27 461
28 Utah Retirement Systems UtahRS UT 6 414
29 Virginia Retirement System VirginiaRS VA 68 443
30 Washington State Investment Board WashingtonStateIB WA 11 11
31 Wisconsin Investment Board WisconsinIB WI 68 386
Total 43 392
19 A detailed discussion on the advantages and disadvantages of 
using the MSCI ESG rating as a measure for CSR can be found in 
Chatterji et al. (2009) and Cheng et al. (2013).
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to ensure that our results are not an artefact of using MSCI 
ESG scores.
MSCI ESG assesses companies on seven CSR-specific 
categories on a point-by-point basis and awards each com-
pany a separate score of strengths and concerns for each 
sub-category. These categories comprise: community activi-
ties, diversity, employees’ relations, environmental record, 
product quality, human rights, and corporate governance. 
For our analysis, we calculate a single CSR score  (CSRa) 
that best captures the overall CSR performance of a com-
pany. The main argument behind this approach is that public 
pension funds look at the entirety of a firm’s CSR profile 
when deciding whether, and how much, they want to invest 
in a particular company. In other words, public pension 
funds cannot invest in a sub-set of a firm’s CSR performance 
(e.g., only the strength or concern components), which is 
why we focus on overall CSR scores. In addition, netting 
the strength and concern scores is a common approach in 
empirical finance studies and has been extensively used in 
related work (Barnea and Rubin 2010; Hong and Kostovet-
sky 2012; Di Giuli and Kostovetsky 2014).
To construct our CSR scores  (csrit), we first deduct the 
number of strengths from the number of concerns for each 
of the seven MSCI ESG sub-categories. Kotchen and Moon 
(2012) point out that some of the asssessed items in the sub-
categories have been added or removed over the years. Thus, 
the aggregate scores might lack comparability over time. We 
follow Kotchen and Moon (2012) and Hong and Liskovich 
(2015) and standardise net sub-category scores per year, so 
that each year the net sub-category score is scaled to a mean 
of zero and a standard deviation of one. The standardisation 
by year ensures that our results are not affected by increases 
in the number of assessed items over the sample period.20 
We aggregate the standardised sub-category scores to cre-
ate an overall CSR score, ensuring that each sub-category 
is given equal weight in the overall score. Finally, we scale 
the CSR score to have an overall minimum of zero and a 
maximum of one to facilitate the interpretation of the coef-
ficient estimates.
To test our second set of predictions regarding the port-
folio performance of funds, we calculate the quarterly port-
folio-weighted CSR score of each fund ( CSRpfw
jt
 ). We take 
the previously calculated CSR score of each firm ( 
(
CSRit
)
 
and weigh it by its weight in fund j’s portfolio at the end of 
the previous quarter ( wijt−1 ). We then aggregate the weighted 
CSR scores for each fund to arrive at our measure of the 
overall portfolio-weighted CSR score per fund ( CSRpfw
jt
).
Proxies for Political Leaning and Political Pressures
Next, we turn to the proxies for the political leaning of the 
funds’ beneficiaries. As state pension funds do not have 
detailed information on the political affiliations of their 
members, the closest proxy for their beneficiaries’ political 
leaning is the political leaning of the state they are located 
in. We judge this as a viable proxy for the beneficiaries’ 
political values as members of state pension funds represent 
a considerable share of the state’s population and state pen-
sion funds indirectly account responsible to all taxpayers of 
a state. As the responsibility for funding the defined benefit 
funds of state pension plans ultimately lies with the sponsor-
ing government, even taxpayers that are not employed in the 
public sector have a stake in how these pension funds are 
managed (Coronado et al. 2003; Brown et al. 2015). Note 
that we do not require that all members of funds located in 
states concentrated by Democrats (Republicans) be Demo-
crat (Republican). Rather, we only assume that individuals 
in states concentrated by Democrats (Republicans) are more 
likely to subscribe to the Democratic (Republican) political 
ideologies, so that the political leaning of the state serves as an 
indicator for public pension funds regarding the predominant 
political tendencies of their beneficiaries’ base.21 To capture 
whether a state’s population is Democratic-leaning, we rely on 
the percentage of a state’s votes received by the Democratic 
Party in the latest presidential elections, which we obtain from 
Dave Leip’s Atlas of US Presidential Elections.22 This source 
is widely used in empirical studies in finance to proxy for the 
political environment of a state (e.g., Pe’er and Gottschalg 
2011; Di Giuli and Kostovetsky 2014). We construct two 
proxies for beneficiaries’ political leaning: (a) the percentage 
of a state’s votes received by the Democratic Party in the latest 
presidential elections (% of Votes for Democratic Party), and 
(b) a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the per-
centage of a state’s votes received by the Democratic Party is 
larger than the percentage of the state’s votes received by the 
Republican Party, and zero otherwise (Democrat-Dummy).
Our proxy for political pressures by state politicians is 
based on the composition of the state government. We fol-
low Di Giuli and Kostovetksy (2014) and define the pro-
portion of a state’s government that is affiliated with the 
Democratic Party (% of Dem. State Gov.) as:
(3)
% ofDem. StateGov. = 0.5 ∗ Dem.Governor
+ 0.25 ∗ Dem.Upper Chamber
+ 0.25 ∗ Dem. Lower Chamber
20 MSCI ESG changed its methodology in 2009 which led to an 
inflationary increase in net CSR scores. In unreported results, we 
restrict the sample to before 2009 and find that our results are qualita-
tively unchanged.
21 Recent studies use a similar location-based identification strategy 
for individual investors to infer their political leaning (Bonaparte 
et al. 2017).
22 See http://www.usele ction atlas .org.
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 where Dem. Governor is a dummy variable equal to one if 
the state governor is a Democrat, and zero otherwise, and 
Dem. Lower Chamber and Dem. Upper Chamber are the 
proportions of the Lower and Upper Chamber of the state 
government, respectively, that are affiliated with the Dem-
ocratic Party. We also construct a dummy variable (Dem. 
State Gov.-Dummy) that captures whether the majority of 
the state government are Democrats. In particular, Dem. 
State Gov.-Dummy equals one if % of Dem. State Gov. > 
50%, and zero otherwise. The data on the composition of the 
Lower and Upper Chamber are taken from the US Census 
Bureau’s National Data Book. Information on State Gover-
nors is obtained from the National Governors’ Association.23
To test the conditional effects of beneficiaries’ political 
leaning and political pressures, we construct four additional 
proxies: (a) Dem. Leaning and Dem. State Gov. − Dummy 
equals one if the funds’ beneficiaries are Democratic-leaning 
and the majority of the state government are Democrats (i.e., 
Democrat-Dummy = 1 and Dem. State Gov.-Dummy = 1), 
and zero otherwise; (b) Dem. Leaning and Rep. State Gov.-
Dummy takes the value of one if the funds’ beneficiaries are 
Democratic-leaning and the majority of the state government 
is not affiliated with the Democratic Party (i.e., Democrat-
Dummy = 1 and Dem. State Gov.-Dummy = 0), and zero oth-
erwise; (c) Rep. Leaning and Dem. State Gov.-Dummy equals 
one if the funds’ beneficiaries are Republican-leaning and the 
majority of the state government are Democrats (i.e., Demo-
crat-Dummy = 0 and Dem. State Gov.-Dummy = 1), and zero 
otherwise; and (d) Rep. Leaning and Rep. State Gov.-Dummy 
takes the value of one if the funds’ beneficiaries are Republi-
can and the majority of the state government is not affiliated 
with the Democratic Party (i.e., Democrat-Dummy = 0 and 
Dem. State Gov.-Dummy = 0), and zero otherwise.
Control Variables
Since portfolio allocation decisions and portfolio perfor-
mance depend on a variety of company, fund and state-spe-
cific factors, we employ several controls that are linked to 
fund’s investment decisions at the portfolio company level, 
pension fund level and state level. We rely on the CRSP 
database for stock price data and the Compustat database 
for financial accounting data to control for company-specific 
characteristics of the portfolio companies. We obtain data 
on state pension fund characteristics from the Public Plans 
Database provided by the Centre for Retirement Research 
at Boston College which we supplement with manually col-
lected data from state pension funds’ Comprehensive Annual 
Financial Reports. Our state level data is obtained from a 
variety of publicly available sources.
Firm‑Level Controls
The characteristics of the portfolio companies, i.e., the 
investment targets, may influence the public pension funds’ 
decision with respect to the proportion of their portfo-
lio that they want to invest in the stocks of that company. 
For instance, many public pension funds benchmark their 
equity performance against a market-weighted equity index 
and hence, are likely to invest a larger share of their assets 
in firms of larger size as measured by firms’ stock market 
capitalisation (Del Guercio and Tkac 2002). To control for 
this positive relation between funds’ portfolio weights and 
the portfolio firms’ size, we include the log-transformed 
market capitalisation of the portfolio company, calculated 
as the product of the price per share and the number of 
shares outstanding, as a control variable. In addition, pub-
lic pension funds may have preferences for value or growth 
stocks and tilt their portfolio towards companies with high 
book-to-market ratio and/or away from firms with low book-
to-market ratio. Thus, we include as a control variable the 
natural logarithm of the portfolio firm’s book value of the 
equity over the market value of equity, measured at the end 
of the previous quarter. We are agnostic about the sign of the 
relationship between funds’ portfolio weights and a portfolio 
firm’s book-to-market ratio. Moreover, some funds might 
have policies in place that restrict them from investing in 
non-dividend paying firms or firms with large dividend cuts, 
as argued in Parrino et al. (2003). Consequently, their port-
folio allocation decisions might be sensitive to a firm’s divi-
dend pay-out policy. We account for this feature by includ-
ing the firms’ dividend yield, i.e., the ratio of dividends per 
share over the price per share, measured at the end of the 
previous quarter, as an additional portfolio firm control.
The degree of a company’s debt ratio computed as the 
portfolio firm’s total debt over total assets serves as a meas-
ure of firm distress and indebtedness which might also affect 
funds’ portfolio allocations as portfolio firms with higher 
leverage are considered to be riskier investments (Cox et al. 
2008; Di Giuli and Kostovetsky 2014). As a measure of a 
portfolio firm’s exposure to systematic market risk, we fur-
ther include its stock market beta. A higher beta implies 
a greater exposure to systematic risk factors and hence a 
riskier investment (Cox et al. 2008). We construct beta coef-
ficients based on rolling regressions of a stock’s monthly 
excess return on the market risk premium (i.e., the S&P500 
return in excess of the risk-free rate) and an intercept, over 
a 36-month window.
Finally, funds’ portfolio allocation choices may be subject 
to the prior financial performance of that holding company. 
Hence, we control for a portfolio firm’s return on assets as 
an accounting-based performance measure and a compa-
ny’s quarterly stock return to measure market-based per-
formance. Return on assets is defined as the income before 23 See http://www.nga.org/cms/home.html.
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extraordinary items divided by a firm’s total assets (Cox 
et al. 2008; Di Giuli and Kostovetsky 2014) and a firm’s 
quarterly stock return is calculated as the stock’s continu-
ously compounded previous-quarter return. The latter meas-
ure also accounts for potential momentum trading by funds 
which involves the conditioning of portfolio allocations on 
a stock’s past performance.
Fund‑Level Controls
Several characteristics at the level of the public pension 
fund are argued to affect both the fund’s portfolio allocation 
choices and its portfolio performance. First, we include the 
natural logarithm of public pension funds’ actuarial assets 
under GASB standards to control for fund size. Fund size 
can influence portfolio allocation decisions and performance 
through various channels. First, it can be assumed that the 
larger the pension fund, the more professional its asset man-
agement and the more resources are allocated to investment 
research, including more investment staff and wider access 
to CSR information. Second, as larger funds are more likely 
to hold a larger ownership stake in a company they are 
considered more influential and may get access to superior 
information. Third, Coronado et al. (2003) provide evidence 
of a positive relation between fund size and the incentive for 
political intervention as politicians seek to maximise their 
relatively short-term political interests. Finally, Sievaenen 
et al. (2013) show that larger funds are more likely to engage 
in responsible investing.
Furthermore, pension fund’s security selection decisions 
might differ depending on the proportion of their assets 
invested in equities. For example, Coronado et al. (2003) 
show that the fraction of the portfolio invested in equities 
affects state pension funds’ total rate of return. Thus, we 
expect that funds, which show a higher allocation to equity 
and whose overall performance depends more strongly on 
the performance of their equity holdings, dedicate more 
resources to analysing and managing these holdings. The 
percentage of a pension fund’s assets invested in public equi-
ties is supposed to control for these effects. Moreover, we 
employ the proportion of shares outstanding held by a pen-
sion fund in a particular company. It is defined as the ratio 
of the number of shares held by the pension fund over a 
company’s total number of shares outstanding. As pointed 
out in Parrino et al. (2003) and Fich et al. (2015), the larger 
the ownership share of a fund in a company the more likely 
this fund is to have access to board members, senior manag-
ers, suppliers and customers of the company and thus to gain 
superior information. Moreover, the larger the fund’s owner-
ship, the more attention and resources is the fund expected 
to allocate to that particular company.
Additionally, several studies show that the funding situa-
tion of a pension fund significantly affects its portfolio allo-
cation and risk-taking behaviour as well as the degree of 
political pressures on the fund (Novy-Marx and Rauh 2011; 
Andonov et al. 2017; Mohan and Zhang 2014). We control 
for these effects using pension funds’ funded ratio under the 
GASB standards, defined as the ratio of actuarial assets over 
actuarial liabilities, updated at the end of the year (Hochberg 
and Rauh 2013). We also add the inflation assumption that 
the fund uses for its actuarial valuations to our set of pension 
fund controls. This variable accounts for the fund’s expecta-
tion of future price developments and inflationary tendencies 
which can affect its allocation towards equities.
We include the fund’s age, measured as the natural log-
arithm of the difference between the current year and the 
fund’s year of inception, since an older fund may have more 
investment experience and a different membership structure. 
To further address differences in the membership structure 
of funds, we include the fund’s ratio of active members to 
beneficiaries. Regarding a fund’s portfolio allocation deci-
sions, the membership structure can affect a fund’s liquid-
ity preferences, and its objective to generate high returns 
to ensure satisfying all future benefit payments. Finally, 
we account for the pension fund’s overall performance by 
including the total fund return as reported in the fund’s 
annual report to our set of fund controls.
State‑Level Controls
The portfolio allocation choices of a fund and the degree 
of outside pressures it experiences may depend on the eco-
nomic and social characteristics of its state. To account for 
these state-specific effects, we include several controls. 
First, we include the state’s real gross domestic product 
(GDP) per capita and the state’s corporate net income 
taxes over total tax revenues as proxies for local economic 
growth (Bradley et al. 2016). These measures are retrieved 
from the Bureau of Economic Analysis and the US Census, 
respectively. We also control for a state’s level of political 
corruption which is defined as the number of federal, state 
and local public officials convicted of a corruption-related 
crime, divided by the state’s population. Several previ-
ous studies have established that this measure is related to 
US state pension funds’ investment and funding decisions 
(Hochberg and Rauh 2013; Bradley et al. 2016). The data 
on political corruption convictions is retrieved from the US 
Department of Justice’s Report to Congress on the Activi-
ties and Operations of the Public Integrity Section. Finally, 
we employ the proportion of government employees who 
are union members to capture the influence of unions in 
public pension fund decision-making and investment pro-
cesses. We retrieve the data from Barry Hirsch’s Union 
Membership and Coverage Database which is described 
State Pension Funds and Corporate Social Responsibility: Do Beneficiaries’ Political Values…
1 3
in Hirsch and Macpherson (2003). It can be argued that 
unions’ objectives and agendas more closely align with the 
Democratic political beliefs and hence a stronger influence 
of unions in certain states can affect the state pension funds’ 
preferences for certain CSR policies, such as employee-
friendly practices and policies.
Estimation Techniques
Portfolio Allocation Model
To test our first set of predictions relating to public pension 
funds’ portfolio allocation decisions, we estimate a series of 
fixed effect panel regressions with the portfolio weight 
(
wijt
)
 
as the dependent variable.24 The main independent varia-
bles are the company’s lagged CSR score 
(
CSRit−1
)
 and the 
lagged CSR score interacted with one of the political prox-
ies 
(
CSRit−1 × politicalproxyjt
)
 . As MSCI ESG updates its 
ratings at the end of each year and publishes the ratings in 
January, we use lagged CSR scores to avoid any look-ahead 
bias. We also include the set of control variables described 
in the previous section. Employing fixed effects at the fund-
security level, the regression model can be expressed as 
follows:
 where political proxyjt is one of the political prox-
ies described in Section "Main Independent Variables"; 
firm controlsit−1 , fund controlsjtand state controlsjt are column 
vectors of the seven company-specific, eight fund-specific 
and four state-specific controls; vij are fund-security fixed 
effects and uijt is an idiosyncratic disturbance term.
The unit of measurement is the fund-security-quarter 
level. As we employ a fixed effects panel model we only 
focus on the within-variation. That means we study the var-
iation in portfolio weights per fund-security combination 
over time but not across funds and securities. Effects that 
are particular to the fund-security combination are captured 
in the fixed effects ( 
(
vij
)
 . Since funds are expected to hold 
similar portfolio weights in a particular S&P500 company 
over consecutive quarters, we correct standard errors by 
clustering at the fund-security level to reflect this clustered 
sampling. Our benchmark portfolio allocation model com-
prises around 530,000 observations and more than 20,000 
fund-security fixed effects.
(4)
wijt = 훽0 + 훽1CSRit−1 + 훽2CSRit−1 × Political proxyjt
+ 훽�
3
Firm controlsit−1 + 훽
�
4
Fund controlsjt
+ 훽�
5
State controlsjt + vij + uijt
Financial Performance Model
To test our second set of predictions regarding funds’ port-
folio performance, we follow Bradley et al. (2016) and esti-
mate a portfolio performance model at the fund level in a 
multivariate panel setting. The model can be expressed as 
follows:
 where rjt is the quarterly portfolio-weighted return of fund 
j over quarter t, CSRpfw
jt−1
 is the portfolio-weighted CSR score 
of fund j at quarter t-1, political proxyjt is one of the political 
proxies described in Section "Main Independent Variables", 
fund controlsjt and state controlsjt are column vectors includ-
ing seven fund-specific and four state-specific effects. We 
include pension fund fixed effects ( vj ) to absorb time invari-
ant characteristics within a fund. For all model specifica-
tions, standard errors are clustered at the fund-level to cor-
rect for serial correlation in residuals. As we only have a 
very limited number of quarterly holdings for some of the 
funds, we restrict the sample for this empirical analysis to 
those funds with at least 25 quarters of holdings data which 
reduces our sample to 18 funds.25 The fund performance 
model includes 1080 observations.
Findings and Discussion of Results
Summary Statistics
The discussion of results begins by presenting descriptive 
statistics for the sample data. Table 2 provides summary 
statistics (Panel A) and a correlation matrix (Panel B) for 
the main variables employed in the empirical analyses. The 
mean (median) portfolio weight held by a pension fund in 
one of the S&P500 companies is 0.23% (0.09%). These 
values correspond closely to the respective values for the 
weight of the companies in the S&P500 index—the mean 
(median) weight of a firm in the S&P500 index during our 
sample period is 0.20% (0.09%)—indicating that our funds 
tend to follow the S&P500 closely. The difference between 
the mean portfolio weight of our sample funds and the mean 
weight of a company in the S&P500 relates to few pension 
funds holding only a small subset of S&P500 firms and/
(5)
rjt = 훽0 + 훽1CSR
pfw
jt−1
+ 훽2CSR
pfw
jt−1
× Political Proxyjt
+ 훽�
3
FundControlsjt + 훽
�
4
State Controlsjt + vj + 휖jt
24 To select between the fixed effects and random effects estimator, 
we conduct a Hausman (1978) test.
25 These funds include: CalPERS, CalSTRS, ColoradoPERA, Flori-
daSBA, KentuckyRetS, KentuckyTRS, MichiganTreas, NJInvB, 
NYStateComRS, NYStateTRS, NewMexicoERB, OhioPERS, Ohi-
oTRS, PennPSERS, TexasERS, TexasTRS, VirginiaRS, WisconsinIB.
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or allocating a large proportion of their portfolio to single 
companies.26
Looking at the dependent variable of the financial perfor-
mance model, the fund portfolio return, we find a consider-
able degree of variation regarding funds’ quarterly perfor-
mance on their S&P500 holdings.27 The average (median) 
quarterly return on funds’ portfolio is 0.7% (2.2%) which 
suggests that funds only marginally generate a positive 
quarterly return on their S&P500 holdings; but the standard 
deviation of 9.2% as well as the minimum of -32.1% and 
the maximum of 16.6% show that these averages mask the 
level of variability in fund performance across the sample. 
Turning to the CSR performance measures, the CSR score 
at the fund-security level and the portfolio-weighted CSR 
score at the fund level have comparable mean and median 
values of 0.49 with a standard deviation of 0.11 and 0.012, 
respectively. While it has been noted in the previous litera-
ture that CSR measures can be relatively stable over time, 
we still find a reasonable level of variability in our sam-
ple. Regarding the political leaning of the funds’ members, 
the state population of the sample funds votes, on average, 
50% for the Democratic Party, though the range of values 
from 25 to 63% indicates some strongly Democratic-leaning 
and strongly Republican-leaning states in our sample. The 
mean value of 0.64 for the Democrat-Dummy implies that 
the members of the average pension fund are likely to be pre-
dominantly Democratic-leaning. Additionally, we find that 
the pension funds in our sample tend to be located in states 
with a non-Democratic state government, as indicated by the 
mean values of the variables % of Dem. State Gov. (0.42) 
and Dem. State Gov.-Dummy (0.32) which clearly lie below 
50%. This provides first evidence that the political leaning 
of the state population and the dominant party in the state 
government are not necessarily in line, and that our political 
proxies pick up different effects.28
Turning to the correlations between our control variables 
(Panel B, Table 2), the highest (absolute) correlations are 
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26 In unreported tests, we restrict our sample to funds that hold less 
than 90% of S&P500 companies and find that our results are qualita-
tively unchanged.
27 The total number of observations for Fund Portfolio Returns and 
Portfolio-weighted CSR Score are lower than for the other variables 
as these variables are employed in the financial performance model 
whose unit of measurement is the pension fund-level, while the other 
variables are reported at the fund-security level.
28 Furthermore, in states with a Democratic-leaning population the 
union coverage among public employees is sizably higher than in 
those with a Republican population. This divide is less pronounced 
for funds from states with Democratic and Non-Democratic state gov-
ernments. This lends support that our proxy for members’ political 
leaning captures the attitudes of the population, whereas the composi-
tion of the state government captures the characteristics of the politi-
cal system.
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between our measure of a state’s political leaning (% of Votes 
for Democratic Party) and the size of the fund as well as the 
state’s degree of union membership by public employees and 
real GDP, which reinforces the importance to control for the 
demographic and economic characteristics of the state. As 
% of Votes for Democratic Party is included as an interac-
tion term with the CSR score, we conclude that concerns of 
multicollinearity are not an issue in our data.
Portfolio Allocation Model
Table 3 reports results from our portfolio allocation model, 
expressed in Eq. (4), which allows us to test the first set of 
hypotheses relating to the drivers of funds’ portfolio alloca-
tion decisions towards firms’ CSR score. In each specifica-
tion, we interact the CSR score with a different political 
proxy.
Turning to the results of the model, for all five model 
specifications, we obtain negative and statistically signifi-
cant regression coefficients on the CSR score indicating 
that the higher the company’s CSR score the less weight 
does this company generally constitute in a fund’s portfolio. 
These results are in line with Barnea and Rubin’s (2010) 
finding of a negative relation between a firm’s CSR per-
formance and its equity ownership by US public pension 
funds, although, unlike Barnea and Rubin (2010), our model 
explains funds’ portfolio weights and not the percentage of 
ownership in a firm. One possible explanation for the nega-
tive relation between portfolio weights and CSR scores may 
relate to funds’ tendency to follow index weights (Parrino 
et al. 2003). In unreported results, we find a negative asso-
ciation between a firm’s weight in the S&P500 index and 
its CSR score, so if state pension funds followed S&P500 
index weights, we expect to find a negative coefficient on 
the standalone CSR score. However, in this case the iden-
tified negative relation does not reflect funds’ preferences 
toward CSR but rather their tendency to follow the S&P500 
index. To ensure that our results are not purely driven by 
funds’ tendency to follow the index, we substitute the port-
folio weights with deviations from S&P500 weights in Sec-
tion "Deviations from Benchmark Weights", and find that 
the negative coefficient on the CSR standalone score loses 
its statistical significance.
To assess whether the direction of the relation changes 
based on the different political drivers, we need to look at 
the values of the interaction term of the CSR score with the 
political proxies. Specifications (1) and (2) test the implica-
tions of the “beneficiaries’ interests” channel expressed in 
hypothesis H1a by interacting the CSR score with % of Votes 
for Democratic Party and the Democrat-Dummy, respec-
tively. Both variables serve as indicators whether the mem-
bers of the pension fund are predominantly Democratic-
leaning. We find a positive and highly significant regression 
coefficient on both interaction terms, suggesting that funds 
with predominantly Democratic-leaning beneficiaries hold 
a higher portfolio weight in companies that perform well 
on CSR, compared to funds with predominantly Republi-
can-leaning members. This finding provides first evidence 
consistent with the portfolio allocation implications of the 
“beneficiaries’ interests” channel.
In specifications (3) and (4), we test whether conditioning 
on political pressures by state politicians affects funds’ pro-
pensity to tilt their portfolio towards firms with better CSR 
performance. We interact the CSR score with % of Dem. 
State Gov. and the Dem. State Gov.-Dummy, respectively. 
We find a positive relation between the portfolio weight 
and the company’s CSR score for funds from states where 
the majority of the state government is affiliated with the 
Democratic Party as indicated by the positive and significant 
coefficient estimates on both interaction terms. Thus, pub-
lic pension funds tilt their portfolios more strongly towards 
companies with higher CSR scores if they face greater pres-
sures by state politicians, consistent with the prediction of 
hypothesis H2a of the “political pressures” channel. How-
ever, when comparing the magnitude of the coefficients on 
the interaction terms of specifications (1) and (2) with those 
of specifications (3) and (4), respectively, the effect of politi-
cal pressures by Democratic state politicians seems to be 
considerably lower in economic magnitude than the effect 
arising from the political leaning of funds’ beneficiaries.
To evaluate the relative importance of the “beneficiaries’ 
interests” channel and the “political pressures” channel, we 
interact the CSR score with the proxies that condition on 
both political dimensions. The omitted group are funds with 
Democratic-leaning members and a predominantly Repub-
lican state government (Dem. Leaning & Rep. State Gov. 
-Dummy). Thus, the coefficients on the interaction terms 
have to be interpreted as deviations from this category. Turn-
ing to the results presented in specification (5), the coeffi-
cient on the interaction term for the Dem. Leaning & Dem. 
State Gov.-Dummy is significantly positive, implying that 
public pension funds with Democratic-leaning members 
show an even stronger CSR preference if the state govern-
ment is dominated by the Democratic Party, which suggests 
that state politicians might exercise a reinforcing effect on 
funds’ portfolio allocations. In comparison, we find a nega-
tive coefficient on the interaction terms for the Rep. Leaning 
& Dem. State Gov.-Dummy and the Rep. Leaning & Rep. 
State Gov.-Dummy. These findings indicate that funds with 
Republican members tilt away from companies with strong 
CSR performance, irrespective of whether these funds 
might be subject to higher pressures by Democratic state 
politicians. One way of interpreting these findings is that the 
political leaning of funds’ members is the dominant force 
behind funds’ preferences for CSR, in line with hypothesis 
H1a of the “beneficiaries’ interests” channel. In comparison, 
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Table 3  Portfolio allocation model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Portf. Weight Portf. Weight Portf. Weight Portf. Weight Portf. Weight
CSR Score − 0.390*** − 0.149*** − 0.144*** − 0.136*** − 0.130***
(0.0520) (0.0198) (0.0193) (0.0191) (0.0192)
CSR Score × % of Votes for Democratic Party 0.507***
(0.0927)
CSR Score × Democrat-Dummy 0.0278***
(0.00665)
CSR Score × % of Dem. State Gov. 0.0355***
(0.00615)
CSR Score × Dem. State Gov.-Dummy 0.0185***
(0.00378)
CSR Score × Rep. Leaning & Rep. State Gov. Dummy − 0.0184**
(0.00779)
CSR Score × Rep. Leaning & Dem. State Gov. Dummy − 0.0188**
(0.00743)
CSR Score × Dem. Leaning & Dem. State Gov. Dummy 0.0192***
(0.00414)
Lagged Log Market Capitalisation 0.170*** 0.170*** 0.170*** 0.170*** 0.170***
(0.00536) (0.00536) (0.00536) (0.00535) (0.00536)
Lagged Log Book-to-Market Value − 0.00723*** − 0.00693*** − 0.00711*** − 0.00705*** − 0.00701***
(0.00232) (0.00232) (0.00232) (0.00232) (0.00232)
Lagged Dividend Yield 0.0777*** 0.0802*** 0.0789*** 0.0799*** 0.0788***
(0.0166) (0.0167) (0.0166) (0.0167) (0.0167)
Lagged Debt Ratio − 0.0718*** − 0.0717*** − 0.0710*** − 0.0723*** − 0.0720***
(0.0115) (0.0115) (0.0116) (0.0115) (0.0115)
Lagged Return on Assets 0.00283 0.00359 0.00382 0.00395 0.00353
(0.00682) (0.00681) (0.00678) (0.00679) (0.00680)
Lagged Beta Coefficient − 0.00525*** − 0.00505** − 0.00510** − 0.00495** − 0.00515**
(0.00200) (0.00200) (0.00200) (0.00200) (0.00200)
Lagged Log Security Return − 0.0299*** − 0.0303*** − 0.0304*** − 0.0303*** − 0.0303***
(0.00261) (0.00261) (0.00261) (0.00261) (0.00261)
Log Fund Assets 0.0151 0.0307** 0.0220* 0.0269** 0.0267**
(0.0131) (0.0127) (0.0129) (0.0128) (0.0128)
% invested in Equities − 0.0758*** − 0.0896*** − 0.117*** − 0.113*** − 0.0956***
(0.0192) (0.0191) (0.0190) (0.0190) (0.0193)
Funded Ratio 0.000765 − 0.00361 0.00305 − 0.00364 − 0.00447
(0.0138) (0.0137) (0.0138) (0.0137) (0.0136)
% of of Share Outstanding Held 0.0971*** 0.0969*** 0.0970*** 0.0969*** 0.0969***
(0.0321) (0.0320) (0.0319) (0.0319) (0.0320)
Log Fund Age − 0.114*** − 0.107*** − 0.122*** − 0.127*** − 0.122***
(0.0383) (0.0384) (0.0384) (0.0386) (0.0386)
Active Members to Beneficiaries 0.0515*** 0.0533*** 0.0483*** 0.0508*** 0.0515***
(0.00718) (0.00718) (0.00718) (0.00717) (0.00721)
Inflation Assumption − 0.528 − 0.586 − 0.773** − 0.768** − 0.741**
(0.364) (0.363) (0.366) (0.365) (0.369)
Total Fund Return − 0.0783*** − 0.0799*** − 0.0782*** − 0.0774*** − 0.0786***
(0.00480) (0.00478) (0.00479) (0.00479) (0.00478)
% Union Members − 0.000199 0.000134 − 0.000112 − 0.000161 − 0.00008
(0.000359) (0.000356) (0.000360) (0.000367) (0.000368)
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political pressures from Democratic state politicians seem to 
merely have a moderating effect on funds’ CSR tilts, provid-
ing only limited support for the implications of the “political 
pressures” channel expressed in H2a. The significant coef-
ficients on the interaction terms of the CSR score with the 
different political proxies are not consistent with H3a of the 
“pure financial motives” channel, which predicts an insig-
nificant effect of such proxies on the portfolio allocation of 
public pension funds.
Turning to the estimated coefficients on the control vari-
ables, we find that public pension funds tend to invest more 
in larger companies, in line with a tendency of funds to 
follow the market weights (Del Guercio and Tkac 2002). 
Portfolio weights are also higher for companies with lower 
book-to-market ratios, lower debt ratios and lower market 
risk exposure. In line with Parrino et al.’s (2003) argument 
that funds’ portfolio allocations are sensitive to firm’s divi-
dend policies, we find that funds allocate a higher portfolio 
weight to companies paying higher dividends. A potential 
explanation for this effect relates to the liquidity implications 
of dividend payments in relation to funds’ obligations of 
benefit payments. Surprisingly, our sample funds also seem 
to increase their allocation to companies that had a lower 
return in the previous quarter, suggesting that funds follow 
a contrarian investment strategy. Additionally, controlling 
for fund and state characteristics seems to be important as 
indicated by the statistically significant coefficients on all 
fund and state controls. While the results on most of these 
variables are difficult to interpret in this regression setting, 
the positive coefficient on the percentage of shares outstand-
ing suggests that pension funds tilt their portfolio towards 
companies over which they can exercise greater control. This 
finding is in line with the reasoning in Fich et al. (2015).
Portfolio Performance Model
Next, we turn to the results of the portfolio performance 
model expressed in Eq. (5) and presented in Table 4. Speci-
fications (1)–(2) show results for all funds, while specifica-
tions (3)–(6) and specifications (7)–(10) condition on the 
fund beneficiaries’ political leaning and the political pres-
sures by state politicians, respectively. We run each specifi-
cation with fund fixed effects and test the robustness of our 
findings to controlling for time-specific performance trends 
by including quarter fixed effects in specifications (2), (4), 
(6), (8), and (10).
As can be seen in Table 4, eight out of ten specifications 
suggest a positive and significant relation between funds’ 
portfolio-weighted CSR score and their quarterly portfolio 
return, implying that funds with a stronger CSR performance 
of their holdings generate higher returns. However, this asso-
ciation weakens in statistical significance once we control 
for quarter fixed effects and becomes statistically insignifi-
cant in specifications (6) and (8).
Dividing the funds in sub-samples based on our political 
proxies allows us to test whether the CSR-performance link 
is restricted to specific subsets of sample funds or applies 
to all funds irrespective of the leaning of their beneficiar-
ies (specifications (3)-(6)) and political pressures by state 
politicians (specifications (7)-(10)). Interestingly, we find 
that the strongest statistical effect of the funds’ portfolio-
weighted CSR score on fund returns is observed for funds 
This table reports estimated coefficients from fixed effect panel regressions expressed in Eq. (4)
The sample runs from 1997Q1 to 2013Q4
Standard errors are clustered at the fund-security level and are shown in brackets
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively
Table 3  (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Portf. Weight Portf. Weight Portf. Weight Portf. Weight Portf. Weight
Political Corruption Convictions 0.00320 0.000771 0.00158 − 0.000412 0.000685
(0.00786) (0.00792) (0.00790) (0.00793) (0.00807)
Log Real GDP per Capita − 0.293*** − 0.300*** − 0.313*** − 0.319*** − 0.307***
(0.0359) (0.0359) (0.0355) (0.0355) (0.0362)
Net Corp. Income Taxes to Total Taxes − 0.00243** − 0.00250** − 0.00232* − 0.00230* − 0.00211*
(0.00119) (0.00119) (0.00120) (0.00121) (0.00121)
Constant 0.868** 0.643* 1.029*** 1.026*** 0.861**
(0.355) (0.367) (0.357) (0.358) (0.379)
Fund-Security FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 552,929 552,929 552,929 552,929 552,929
Number of FE 20,258 20,258 20,258 20,258 20,258
Adj. R-squared 0.137 0.136 0.136 0.136 0.137
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with predominantly Democratic-leaning members (speci-
fications (3)-(4)) and, to a lesser extent, for funds in states 
where the state government is not dominated by the Demo-
cratic Party (specifications (9)-(10)). In both sub-samples, 
the positive effect prevails even after controlling for time 
effects though its statistical significance weakens, while in 
the other two sub-samples the statistical significance of the 
coefficient estimates vanishes once adding quarter fixed 
effects.
To conclude, our findings are broadly in line with the 
empirical literature on the link between CSR and financial 
performance as the majority of these studies finds a non-
negative, neutral link between portfolios’ CSR and finan-
cial performance, while some studies document a weakly 
positive relation. However, while much of the literature on 
which these findings are derived focuses on portfolios of 
SRI mutual funds, to the best of our knowledge, our study 
is the first to show weakly positive performance effects of 
CSR tilts for US state pension funds. In the light of the 
implications of these findings for fiduciary asset manage-
ment, it is particularly noteworthy that funds with predomi-
nantly Democratic-leaning members show the most consist-
ent positive performance effect of tilting their portfolios 
towards companies with better CSR scores, suggesting that 
the CSR tilts we documented in the previous section are 
not to the financial disadvantage of fund beneficiaries. As 
such and in contrast to Wang and Mao’s (2015) findings, we 
provide empirical evidence that US public pension funds’ 
responsible investment approach can be beneficial to their 
beneficiaries’ interests and is not unidirectionally linked 
to self-serving motives of state politicians. Overall, our 
results are consistent with the predictions of H1b and H3b 
but inconsistent with those of H2b.
Turning to the coefficient estimates on the control variables, 
we do not find many consistent associations between portfo-
lio performance on the one hand and fund-specific and state-
specific characteristics on the other hand, which are robust 
to the inclusion of time fixed effects. Hence, we are cautious 
when drawing conclusions from these results. We find some 
evidence in line with Bauer et al. (2010) suggesting that larger 
funds tend to generate lower returns than their smaller counter-
parts. Attempting to explain this negative association between 
fund size and portfolio performance, Bauer et al. (2010) name 
liquidity limitations associated with larger fund size which 
can restrict public pension funds’ portfolio allocation choices 
and lower their performance. This argument is in line with 
the negative coefficient estimate we find on the proportion of 
a fund’s portfolio invested in equities, as funds which have a 
higher share of their portfolio invested in equities might have 
more limited investment options and are more restricted when 
aiming to adjust their portfolio holdings. However, this effect 
is statistically weak. Additionally, our results provide limited 
support that some older funds and funds with stronger total 
returns tend to generate higher returns on their equity portfolio. 
But again, these effects are subject to the choice of sub-sample 
and sensitive to controlling for time-specific effects. Overall, 
our results lead us to conclude that the majority of fund-spe-
cific and state-specific factors do not have a systematic and 
consistent impact on the performance of funds’ equity portfolio 
throughout our sample period.
Robustness Tests
In this section, we test the robustness of our results to three 
alternative specifications.
Alternative CSR Measure
First, we test that our results are not an artefact of the spe-
cific CSR measure we use by replacing the CSR score of 
MSCI ESG with an alternative CSR rating, the IVA/Eco-
Value21 rating used in Ferrell et al. (2016).29 The IVA/Eco-
Value21 rating is provided by MSCI and it rates companies 
on their environmental risk and opportunities assigning a 
rating of AAA to CCC for each company. We follow Fer-
rell et al. (2016) and transform the letter-based rating into a 
numerical score that ranges from 0 (for CCC, the lowest rat-
ing category) to 6 (for AAA, the highest category). Hence, 
a higher score is associated with a better CSR performance. 
We substitute the lagged CSR score with the firm’s Eco-
Value21 rating at the end of the previous quarter. IVA/Eco-
Value21 ratings are only consistently available for a smaller 
subset of US companies and for a considerably shorter time 
period, which reduces the number of observations to around 
192,000.30 The results are presented in Table 5. Overall, 
we find statistically positive coefficients on the interaction 
terms with our proxies for beneficiaries’ political leaning 
and, slightly weaker, positive coefficients on the proxies for 
political pressures. However, the coefficient estimate on the 
standalone CSR score is now mostly positive and statistically 
significant, providing additional support for our conjecture 
that the negative coefficient on the MSCI ESG-based CSR 
score may be linked to effects unrelated to funds’ investment 
preferences, such as their tendency to follow index weights. 
We control for this more explicitly in Section "Deviations 
from Benchmark Weights".
29 We use the EcoValue21 score as combined IVA ratings are only 
available for a considerably smaller sub-set and time period and 
hence significantly restrict our company coverage. However, the two 
ratings are methodologically very comparable. For a detailed descrip-
tion of the IVA/EcoValue21 ratings refer to Ferrell et al. (2016).
30 Due to the significant loss in firm observations and the typically 
low variability of CSR scores over time, we include fund fixed effects 
in this analysis to allow more variation in our dataset.
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Table 5  Alternative CSR measure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Portf. Weight Portf. Weight Portf. Weight Portf. Weight Portf. Weight
EcoValue21 Rating − 0.000253 0.00387*** 0.00524*** 0.00648*** 0.00905***
(0.00354) (0.000601) (0.000590) (0.000466) (0.000637)
EcoValue21 Rating × % of Votes for Democratic Party 0.0143**
(0.00694)
EcoValue21 Rating × Democrat-Dummy 0.00565***
(0.000786)
EcoValue21 Rating × % of Dem. State Gov. 0.00392***
(0.000983)
EcoValue21 Rating × Dem. State Gov.-Dummy 0.00124*
(0.000682)
EcoValue21 Rating × Rep. Leaning & Rep. State Gov. Dummy − 0.00512***
(0.000905)
EcoValue21 Rating × Rep. Leaning & Dem. State Gov. 
Dummy
− 0.00543***
(0.00119)
EcoValue21 Rating × Dem. Leaning & Dem. State Gov. 
Dummy
0.00128
(0.000850)
Lagged Log Market Capitalisation 0.283*** 0.283*** 0.283*** 0.283*** 0.283***
(0.00151) (0.00151) (0.00151) (0.00151) (0.00151)
Lagged Log Book-to-Market Value 0.0197*** 0.0197*** 0.0198*** 0.0198*** 0.0197***
(0.000973) (0.000972) (0.000972) (0.000972) (0.000972)
Lagged Dividend Yield 0.468*** 0.467*** 0.468*** 0.468*** 0.467***
(0.0403) (0.0403) (0.0403) (0.0403) (0.0403)
Lagged Debt Ratio − 0.0252*** − 0.0254*** − 0.0250*** − 0.0251*** − 0.0254***
(0.00572) (0.00572) (0.00572) (0.00572) (0.00572)
Lagged Return on Assets 0.00249 0.00243 0.00258 0.00251 0.00243
(0.00312) (0.00312) (0.00312) (0.00312) (0.00312)
Lagged Beta Coefficient 0.0259*** 0.0259*** 0.0259*** 0.0259*** 0.0259***
(0.000890) (0.000890) (0.000890) (0.000890) (0.000890)
Lagged Log Security Return − 0.0964*** − 0.0962*** − 0.0965*** − 0.0965*** − 0.0962***
(0.00386) (0.00386) (0.00386) (0.00386) (0.00386)
Log Fund Assets − 0.0625*** − 0.0702*** − 0.0682*** − 0.0604*** − 0.0706***
(0.0155) (0.0154) (0.0156) (0.0154) (0.0154)
% invested in Equities − 0.307*** − 0.305*** − 0.316*** − 0.311*** − 0.305***
(0.0169) (0.0168) (0.0168) (0.0168) (0.0168)
Funded Ratio 0.105*** 0.111*** 0.108*** 0.104*** 0.111***
(0.0141) (0.0141) (0.0141) (0.0141) (0.0141)
% of Share Outstanding Held 0.442*** 0.441*** 0.442*** 0.442*** 0.441***
(0.00827) (0.00825) (0.00826) (0.00827) (0.00825)
Log Fund Age − 0.329*** − 0.326*** − 0.341*** − 0.338*** − 0.338***
(0.0392) (0.0392) (0.0390) (0.0394) (0.0396)
Active Members to Beneficiaries 0.0580*** 0.0580*** 0.0563*** 0.0573*** 0.0569***
(0.00605) (0.00603) (0.00603) (0.00604) (0.00613)
Inflation Assumption − 0.158 − 0.182 − 0.300 − 0.242 − 0.271
(0.415) (0.415) (0.418) (0.419) (0.421)
Total Fund Return − 0.116*** − 0.114*** − 0.118*** − 0.117*** − 0.115***
(0.00972) (0.00974) (0.00972) (0.00973) (0.00974)
% Union Members 0.00185*** 0.00212*** 0.00187*** 0.00180*** 0.00211***
(0.000379) (0.000382) (0.000380) (0.000381) (0.000385)
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Extended Company Coverage
In our main analysis, we restrict the company coverage to 
S&P500 companies to avoid a time bias caused by the sig-
nificant increase in companies covered by the MSCI ESG 
in the early 2000s. To test that our results are not limited to 
S&P500 companies, we include all companies to our sample 
once an MSCI ESG rating is available. We re-calculate port-
folio weights to account for this extended company coverage 
by dividing a fund’s portfolio holding in a company by the 
total value of its holdings in all companies with available 
MSCI ESG scores. The results of this analysis are presented 
in Table 6. While the number of observations increases 
significantly to more than 1,200,000, the coefficient esti-
mates on our main variables of interest remain qualitatively 
unchanged. In particular, the coefficient estimate on the stan-
dalone CSR score is negative and statistically significant and 
the interaction terms of the CSR scores with the political 
proxies remain statistically significant and positive for speci-
fications (1) to (4) and show the same signs and statistical 
significance for specification (5), in line with our baseline 
results presented in Table 3.
Deviations from Benchmark Weights
A substantial proportion of state pension funds’ portfolios is 
indexed (Parrino at al. 2003), and fund managers’ investment 
performance is typically evaluated against a benchmark, 
incentivising managers not to deviate too strongly from 
benchmark weights (Del Guercio and Tkac 2002). Recent 
research suggests that deviations from benchmarks and 
norms are especially informative with respect to superior 
information and investor preferences (e.g., Kumar and Page 
2014), and thus, might be more indicative of funds’ invest-
ment preferences than simple portfolio weights. To account 
for this effect, we calculate the absolute deviation of a fund’s 
portfolio weight from the S&P500 by deducting a company’s 
weight in the S&P500 index from its portfolio weight in the 
fund’s portfolio ( wijt ) and use this as the dependent vari-
able instead of the simple portfolio weights. Table 7 shows 
the results of these tests. In line with our previous results, 
we find a positive relation between the political leaning of 
funds’ members and their portfolio weights in companies 
with higher CSR scores, as indicated by the positive and sta-
tistically significant coefficient estimates on the interaction 
terms in specifications (1) to (4). In line with the findings of 
the baseline model presented in Table 3, the coefficients on 
the interaction terms in specification (5) show the expected 
sign and thus provide additional support that the dominant 
effect stems from beneficiaries’ political values instead of 
pressures by state politicians. Interestingly, the coefficient 
estimates on the standalone CSR scores almost entirely lose 
their statistical significant—except for that in specification 
(5) which remains weakly statistically significant, suggesting 
that the average fund’s deviation from S&P500 benchmark 
weights are not statistically related to the portfolio firm’s 
CSR performance. Only after considering the condition-
ing political dimensions do the preferences towards CSR 
of different funds’ in the sample become apparent. This 
result provides additional support that the negative and sig-
nificant coefficient estimate on the standalone CSR score 
documented in our benchmark regression, is rather linked to 
funds’ tendency to follow S&P500 index weights, instead of 
speaking to funds’ preferences for CSR.
Table 5  (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Portf. Weight Portf. Weight Portf. Weight Portf. Weight Portf. Weight
Political Corruption Convictions 0.0121 0.0124 0.0114 0.0115 0.0129
(0.0143) (0.0143) (0.0143) (0.0143) (0.0145)
Log Real GDP per Capita − 0.511*** − 0.477*** − 0.502*** − 0.512*** − 0.475***
(0.0495) (0.0497) (0.0495) (0.0493) (0.0497)
Net Corp. Income Taxes to Total Taxes − 0.00179 − 0.00161 − 0.00175 − 0.00178 − 0.00158
(0.00148) (0.00148) (0.00148) (0.00148) (0.00148)
Constant 11.47*** 11.20*** 11.52*** 11.50*** 11.23***
(0.568) (0.570) (0.567) (0.567) (0.571)
Fund FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 191,995 191,995 191,995 191,995 191,995
Adj. R-squared 0.609 0.609 0.609 0.609 0.609
This table reports estimated coefficients from the portfolio allocation model where the MSCI ESG-based CSR score is replaced by the IVA/Eco-
Value21 rating as described in Section "Alternative CSR Measure"
Standard errors are clustered at the fund level and are shown in brackets
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % levels, respectively
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Conclusions
This study explores the underlying drivers of US public 
pension funds’ tendency to tilt their portfolios towards 
companies with superior CSR performance. We argue that 
large, internally managed US state pension plans are ideally 
placed to incorporate CSR considerations into their invest-
ment decisions. However, only some of these funds adopt 
responsible investment practices, while others do not show 
an interest in the environmental and social performance of 
their portfolio companies. We explore three channels that 
may explain the heterogeneity in the relation between funds’ 
portfolio holdings and the CSR performance of their invest-
ment targets:
(1) The “beneficiaries’ interests” channel which sug-
gests that state pension funds tilt their portfolios more 
strongly towards companies with superior CSR perfor-
mance if such environmental and social considerations 
are in line with the interests of their beneficiaries;
(2) The “political pressures” channel according to which 
state politicians exert pressures on state pension funds 
to tilt their portfolios towards companies that show 
superior CSR performance in order to serve their own 
political agenda; and.
(3) The “pure financial motives” channel which implies 
that funds tilt their portfolios towards CSR companies 
to boost their financial performance, irrespective of 
beneficiaries’ non-financial interests or political pres-
sures.
Looking at the public equity holdings of 31 US state 
pension plans over the period 1997 to 2013, our empiri-
cal findings are most consistent with the “beneficiaries’ 
interests” channel. First, our analysis of funds’ portfolio 
weights suggests that funds whose beneficiaries show 
stronger concerns for firms’ CSR performance as meas-
ured by state’s political leaning hold larger portfolio 
weights in companies with higher CSR scores, compared 
to funds whose state’s political leaning does not indicate 
Table 6  Robustness test: extended company coverage
This table reports results of the robustness test described in Section Extended Company Coverage, where the sample is extended beyond firms 
included in the S&P500 and comprises funds’ holdings in all companies with an MSCI ESG rating in quarter t
Standard errors are clustered at the fund-security level and are shown in brackets
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % levels, respectively
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Portf. weight Portf. weight Portf. weight Portf. weight Portf. weight
CSR Score − 0.313*** − 0.115*** − 0.105*** − 0.105*** − 0.0993***
(0.0330) (0.0133) (0.0131) (0.0130) (0.0131)
CSR Score × % of Votes for Democratic Party 0.407***
(0.0568)
CSR Score × Democrat-Dummy 0.0194***
(0.00382)
CSR Score × % of Dem. State Gov. 0.00947**
(0.00374)
CSR Score × Dem. State Gov.-Dummy 0.0112***
(0.00215)
CSR Score × Rep. Leaning & Rep. State Gov. Dummy − 0.0154***
(0.00412)
CSR Score × Rep. Leaning & Dem. State Gov. Dummy − 0.0140***
(0.00505)
CSR Score × Dem. Leaning & Dem. State Gov. 
Dummy
0.0103***
(0.00217)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Funds—Security FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,213,798 1,213,798 1,213,798 1,213,798 1,213,798
Number of FE 64,897 64,897 64,897 64,897 64,897
Adj. R-squared 0.0966 0.0962 0.0959 0.0960 0.0963
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a strong interest in environmental and social concerns. We 
further document that the effect of the political values of 
funds’ beneficiaries on their tendency to overweight com-
panies with good CSR credentials dominates the effect of 
potential political pressures by state politicians. Finally, 
we provide evidence that funds which tilt their portfolios 
towards companies with stronger CSR generate a higher 
return than their counterparts, though the statistical sig-
nificance of this performance effect is weak, suggesting 
that it is not the main driver of funds’ investment choices.
Overall, our findings indicate that US public pension funds 
consider financial objectives and moral values of their benefi-
ciaries when deciding whether to incorporate CSR into their 
investment choices. In this way, our results are in line with pre-
vious research by Hong and Kostovetsky (2012), Di Giuli and 
Kostovetsky (2014) and Riedl and Smeets (2017) which sug-
gests an attitude-driven rather than a purely financially moti-
vated preference for CSR by investors. However, in contrast 
to these authors, we find that US state pension funds account 
for beneficiaries’ environmental and social concerns without 
sacrificing financial return. As such our findings correspond 
to survey-based evidence presented in Sievaenen et al. (2017, 
p. 912) who report that European pension funds with respon-
sible investment strategies pay attention to both the CSR focus 
and the financial focus of their investments and in this way 
“can bring balance between finance and responsibility”. Our 
conclusions are also consistent with Cox and Wicks’ (Cox and 
Wicks 2011, p. 160) positive interpretation of the adoption of 
responsible investment strategies by institutional investors as 
“representative of a shift in collective conceptualisations of the 
role, place, and nature of morality in the market.”
In addition, our study provides an antidote to a recent 
study which concluded that public pension funds engage 
in investment activities that serve the political agendas of 
state politicians but are detrimental to beneficiaries’ interests 
and neglect their fiduciary duty (Wang and Mao 2015). In 
contrast, we show that fiduciary duty concerns are the main 
driver of funds’ investment choices regarding CSR and that 
public pension funds have adopted a more holistic considera-
tion of beneficiaries’ interests that spans beyond pure finan-
cial objectives and extends to the impact of investments on 
the physical and social environment.
Table 7  Robustness test: deviation from S&P500 weight
This table reports results of the robustness test described in Section "Deviations from Benchmark Weights", where the dependent variable is the 
absolute deviation of the funds’ portfolio weights from the S&P500 index weights
Standard errors are clustered at the fund-security level and are shown in brackets
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % levels, respectively
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
S&P500 Devia-
tions
S&P500 Devia-
tions
S&P500 Devia-
tions
S&P500 Devia-
tions
S&P500 Devia-
tions
CSR Score − 0.0559 0.00207 0.0101 0.0160 0.0241*
(0.0375) (0.0124) (0.0123) (0.0122) (0.0125)
CSR Score × % of Votes for Dem. 
Party
0.149**
(0.0664)
CSR Score × Democrat-Dummy 0.0255***
(0.00451)
CSR Score × % of Dem. State Gov. 0.0240***
(0.00432)
CSR Score × Dem. State Gov.-
Dummy
0.0122***
(0.00257)
CSR Score × Rep. Leaning & Rep. 
State Gov. Dummy
− 0.0256***
(0.00535)
CSR Score × Rep. Leaning & Dem. 
State Gov. Dummy
− 0.00969*
(0.00573)
CSR score × Dem. Leaning & Dem. 
State Gov. Dummy
0.00805***
(0.00295)
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fund—Security FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 552,929 552,929 552,929 552,929 552,929
Number of FE 20,258 20,258 20,258 20,258 20,258
Adj. R-squared 0.0249 0.0252 0.0252 0.0250 0.0254
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As such, our findings have important implications for 
the debate on the compatibility of CSR considerations with 
investors’ fiduciary duty (e.g. Rounds 2005; Freshfields 
Bruckhaus Deringer 2005; Sethi 2005; Richardson 2007, 
2011; Sandberg 2011; Hawley et al. 2014). Our study lends 
support to claims that a pure financial interpretation of 
funds’ fiduciary duty might run the risk of discounting the 
wider interests of funds’ beneficiaries (e.g. Richardson 2011; 
Lydenberg 2012), and that a more holistic interpretation of 
fiduciary duty is called for, enabling funds to incorporate 
their beneficiaries’ non-financial interests as long as these 
are not detrimental to fund performance. For instance, Jans-
son et al. (2014) surveyed more than 1000 future beneficiar-
ies of the Swedish pension system and found that they prefer 
an extended interpretation of fiduciary duty that incorporates 
social, ethical and environmental concerns in investments 
over a traditional, pure financial focus. Our study provides 
empirical evidence of one channel, namely via positive CSR 
screening, how such social, ethical and environmental con-
cerns of beneficiaries are incorporated by US public pension 
funds.
While such a broadened understanding of fiduciary duty 
may allow funds to serve their beneficiaries’ interests more 
holistically, it also poses new challenges. For instance, how 
should funds define the “best interests” of beneficiaries and 
whose interests should dominate in case that beneficiaries 
differ in their attitudes toward environmental and social 
issues. These questions suggest interesting avenues for 
future research in the area of business ethics and are par-
ticularly important for public pension funds administered 
as defined benefit plans since plan participants do not have 
an option to exit the fund in case that they are dissatisfied 
with the funds’ investment approach (Clark 2004; Sandberg 
et al. 2014; Hoepner and Schopohl 2018). Thus, we hope 
that our study will contribute to the ongoing public debate 
about a re-interpretation of fiduciary duty in light of growing 
environmental and social concerns, by shedding light on the 
moral dimension of beneficiaries’ interests.31
Our study has certain limitations. First, our empirical 
analysis is restricted to large, internally managed US state 
pension funds and specifically focuses on their portfolio 
allocations in public equities. Arguably, these funds are 
best placed to incorporate firms’ CSR performance into their 
investment choices. In contrast, smaller funds with no inter-
nal management might be more limited to adopt such strate-
gies. Hence, it would be interesting to explore to what extent 
beneficiaries’ interests drive the award of external mandates, 
are present in other asset classes (e.g., fixed income), can 
be extended to other markets and countries, and are observ-
able for different responsible investment strategies (e.g., 
negative screening, shareholder engagement). Additionally, 
the empirical design of our study does not allow to identify 
whether public pension funds consciously adjust their port-
folio allocations based on beneficiaries’ political leaning or 
whether these adjustments occur indirectly through a subtle 
change in political climate. Qualitative studies that explore 
the direct investment processes and analyse how public pen-
sion funds incorporate their beneficiaries’ interests would 
supplement our empirical findings and allow a more compre-
hensive understanding of the underlying channels through 
which funds’ serve their beneficiaries.
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